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Essay
The Morality of Law Practice
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
This is an inquiry about the morality of lawyers and law practice. Some modern
academic critiques hold law practice to be immoral or unjust as compared to the
standard of “common morality” or of the sense of “justice” shared in the community.
This Essay advances a different standard of reference, one that takes into account the
pervasive conflicts within society and the limitations on the government’s ability to get
at the truth. These limitations generate a role for lawyers as empowered figures who
employ government authority as partisans and confidantes for their clients. That role is
comparable to other roles that involve exercise of authority, particularly the roles of
government officials and business managers.

* Professor Emeritus, University of California Hastings College of Law; member of the State
Bar of California. My thanks to Charles Marcus, Susan Pinto, Morris Ratner, Dana Remus, Anthony
Scirica, and Nicholas Whipps for many helpful suggestions.
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Introduction
This Essay examines the basic elements of law practice, including
the basic rules of professional ethics and current critiques of the legal
profession, and then sets out a different framework.
I. The Limitations on Effective Government
Bernard Williams, the noted philosopher, observed in Professional
Morality and Its Dispositions, that the legal profession “exists because of
imperfection . . . [and to] serve our needs . . . for a social order.”1
The “need for social order” implies that we must coordinate
conflicting objectives of individuals and institutions in our complex
pluralistic society. The basic mechanism for doing so is private contract,
ranging from informal exchange at the grocery store to technical
documentation in complex financial transactions. Where formal and
informal voluntary contracting are not feasible, government regulations
often step in. In a constitutional regime, government regulations can be
considered a form of public contract in that they are the product of
negotiations inherent in the legislative process. Government regulation
1. Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers’
Roles and Lawyers’ Ethics 259, 269 (David Luban ed., 1984) [hereinafter The Good Lawyer].
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ranges from ordinary police work to complex administrative
intervention. It also includes ordinary civil litigation, which is where
ordinary law practice comes in.
But there are serious “imperfections” in the process of bringing
these controls to bear. The perfectly just imposition of legal controls
would require a perfectly accurate determination of facts and a perfectly
coherent application of law to the facts. In the real world, however, the
legal system must make do with artificially determined facts and
approximations of coherent law. Ordinary law practice requires
practitioners to function within those limitations.

II. Fact and Law
True justice depends on genuine truth, but real world tribunals have
access to truth only as it appears from “evidence.” Most evidence
consists of oral accounts about past events that have since disappeared.
Concerning those events, the disputants have differing accounts and
other witnesses may have still other versions. Documentary evidence can
never be completely unambiguous, and documents may conceal as much
as they reveal. Furthermore, ethical and evidentiary rules exclude highly
relevant information from evidence, notably what the parties have told
their respective lawyers behind the shield of attorney-client privilege,
what the lawyers have experimented with behind the shield of the workproduct rule, and, in criminal cases, the shield of the accused’s privilege
against self-incrimination.
The shortcomings of how our modern legal system expresses rules
of law contribute further to the problem. “Rules of law” are expressed in
general verbal formulations, not in specific mandates addressed to
concrete events. But legal disputes involve idiosyncratic, concrete events
to which specific judgmental response is required. Accordingly, there is a
tension between the generality of the rules and the specificity of the
judgments required in resolving concrete disputes. As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes concisely put it, “General propositions do not decide
concrete cases.”2
Moreover, the American legal system is unusually complex so that
even the governing generalities are often uncertain. In our system, even
detailed regulatory specifications are subordinate to the very general
constitutional requirements of Due Process and Equal Protection. In any
given case, for example, a commercial building development or an
environmental control, potentially relevant rules emanate from all levels
of government—federal, state, and local.3
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
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Because trial court rulings are subject to reversal, any court’s ruling
may be equivocal. All court decisions short of the Supreme Court of the
United States have only regional authority, and even Supreme Court
decisions lack permanent authority. Thus, as a practical matter, much of
the law is a kaleidoscope. Incompletely accurate facts and imprecise law
mean that any given adjudication can be, in an important sense,
defective.
Justice Robert Jackson observed about the Supreme Court of the
United States that: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final.”4 The same can be said of the
legal system as a whole.

III. The Milieu of Uncertainty
When parties have a shared understanding of a situation—their
respective personal and property rights, their expectations, and so on—
their relationship normally can be harmonized without difficulty. In these
circumstances, the parties have no need for legal assistance, or at most,
they need only formal documentation of their relationship. But when
parties require involvement from lawyers, it is typically because the
parties’ understandings and aims are in conflict and beset by confusion. It
is the lawyer’s job to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts, by either
negotiating an agreement between the parties or counseling their clients
about dealing with the unresolved situation. Lawyers’ work, thus,
necessarily involves conflict and a measure of confusion.
The kaleidoscopic nature of law practice in the real world,
therefore, means that lawyering is usually conducted in a milieu of
uncertainty—uncertainty as to the facts of a situation, uncertainty as to
the motives and purposes of the parties, and often uncertainty as to the
rules of law that might govern. On another level, there can be a
fundamental uncertainty about the social standard for truthfulness,
candor, and responsibility to others.
It is convenient to suppose that community sentiment is
substantially uniform, but American mores in fact are heterogeneous.
However, as we shall see through a review of various critiques, a
supposed “common morality” is typically invoked in appraising lawyers’
conduct.
IV. Another Framework
There is an alternative framework, formulated by Sir Isaiah Berlin,
which sustains, and perhaps better explains, American law practice. This
alternative begins with the recognition that the lawyer’s role involves

4. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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distinctive authority and obligations. These include the authority to
speak in court (the “right of audience” as it is traditionally called); the
right to provide realistic legal advice; the right to act as a partisan; and
the right and duty to maintain secrecy in handling client affairs.5 A
lawyer’s authority requires her to invoke governmental power on behalf
of clients—bringing or resisting a lawsuit. It includes giving frank advice
about the imperfections in law—advice that may enable a client to act
unlawfully. It grants immunity from retribution for pursuing an outcome
that the lawyer personally could consider unjust.
In this alternative framework, lawyers are governed not by a
“personal morality” professed in the community at large, but by a
morality involved in the “public organization”—the government itself.
Whether and how far law practice should be endowed with this
distinctive authority is, of course, debatable. Nevertheless, as Professor
Angelo Dondi and I have explained in Legal Ethics: A Comparative
Study, these elements of the lawyer’s role have origins going back
centuries and are recognized in all constitutional regimes.6

V. Realities of Law Practice
A lawyer’s work can be boiled down to four main functions: giving
legal advice, litigation, negotiation, and documentation of agreements. In
each of these functions, a lawyer will almost invariably be called to do
something that contravenes a traditional sense of common morality.
Legal advice, involved in all lawyer tasks, aims foremost at optimizing a
client’s position. Litigation can require lawyers to endorse positions that
they would not adopt for themselves. Negotiation typically entails a
measure of dissimulation. Many lawyer-drafted agreements can be overreaching.
All these functions have been subjected to intense criticism, some of
which is reviewed in this Essay. As we shall see, Professor Markovits has
said that lawyers necessarily lie and cheat;7 Professor Simon has said that
traditional legal ethics requires lawyers to pursue unjust objectives; and
Professor Luban has said that lawyers act immorally when they pursue
for a client an objective they would not pursue for themselves.
These criticisms are at least partly true. It is certainly true that some
lawyers tell lies for the purpose of deceiving others. Litigation and
negotiation are sometimes protracted for strategic reasons, rather than
being centered on the merits. Lawful partisanship and zeal can devolve
into unprofessional aggression. Legal advice can be a roadmap to illegal
conduct.
5. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics ch. 15 (1986).
6. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Angelo Dondi, Legal Ethics: A Comparative Study 93 (2004).
7. Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age 4 (2008).
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But part of the reason for this supposed immoral conduct is that
each of these four functions, coupled with a lawyer’s ethical obligations
to her client, necessarily requires a measure of pretense and deceit. In
particular, lawyers must maintain a high degree of secrecy, not least
concerning their consultations with clients. To maintain secrecy is to
withhold truth, which requires diplomatic skill and sometimes
dissimulation. Dissimulation can amount to deception, and deception is
functionally similar to the use of force, in that it can induce an opposite
party to undertake action voluntarily that otherwise would be
undertaken only under coercion.
Negotiation is central to law practice, whether in addressing
settlement of litigation or the resolution of a proposed transaction.
Negotiation is a set of exchanges in which the parties can move from
unresolved difference to an agreeable midpoint. Skillful negotiation
requires lawyers to understand the opposing party’s vital interests but
remain reserved about the client’s interests. A measure of pretense can
sound out possibilities with the aim of “getting to yes.”8
Even lawyers’ work in documentation can entail difficult ethical
problems. When an opposing party (or its lawyer) is unaware of essential
facts, does a lawyer have an obligation to remedy that ignorance? The
judicial authority on that issue is in conflict.9
Lawyers are also sometimes subject to criticism for exploiting, or at
least doing nothing to remedy, asymmetry in legal positions. In so-called
“adhesion contracts,” for example, the stronger party essentially dictates
the contract terms while the weaker party simply adheres to the
proposed terms, or foregoes the transaction.10 Most contracts involving
consumers are adhesion contracts—credit cards, car rentals, bank
accounts, and so on.
There is further asymmetry in the distribution of legal services, a
situation that is commonly a basis of criticism of the legal profession. In
crude terms, it is complained that the rich have all the lawyers in their
pocket. Indeed, the clients who provide the biggest financial returns to a
law practice are typically businesses and other organizations. This
common form of law practice, through myriad contracts, enables
capitalist entrepreneurship to function.
8. See generally Melissa L. Nelken, Negotiation: Theory and Practice ch. 8 (2d ed. 2007).
Lawyers can use stylized phrases to distinguish pretense from truth. Thus, “I can’t recommend that to
my client” can be code for “We reject that,” while “I represent that this . . .” is code for “This is true”.
See generally Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer
Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1992).
9. Compare, e.g., Brown v. Cnty. of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1989), with Stare v. Tate,
98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
10. For example, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, a Seattle resident injured on a cruise ship
was required by a clause in her ticket to bring her suit for damages in Florida, where the cruise
company was headquartered. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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This asymmetry is essentially a problem of public policy, not
individual lawyer ethics or conduct. The Supreme Court has maintained
that there is no constitutional right to legal assistance in civil matters, and
Congress is allergic to legal aid that could pursue substantial legal
change. Compounding the problem, many states and localities are
parsimonious regarding legal assistance to people of modest means.11
Business organizations need lawyers to facilitate “compliance” with the
law.12 But corporate lawyering also can facilitate evasion of the law, as
we shall see through Professor Norman Spaulding. In sum, the ideal of
equal justice accordingly remains an ideal. The current realities of law
practice encourage, or at least do nothing to deter, the pretense and
ambivalence toward inequality that are the subject of many critiques of
lawyers. Lawyers contribute to the problem by adhering to the principle
that legal assistance can be provided only by licensed lawyers.13

VI. Critiques of Lawyers’ Ethics
It is uncomfortable to recognize that coercion, deception, and
unequal access to justice are aspects of ordinary law practice. Indeed,
there has been criticism of lawyers on these grounds as long as there
have been lawyers. In thirteenth-century England, for example, as
Professor Jonathan Rose has shown in The Legal Profession in Medieval
England,14 there were regulatory efforts by the Crown to control lawyer
malfeasance. A prime target was what was called “ambidextrous”
conduct, referring to lawyers who worked on both sides of a transaction
or controversy—what today we call conflict of interest.15 Other targets
were excessive fees and procrastination, evils that still persist.16

11. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (no constitutional right to civil legal
assistance); Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice (2005) (legal profession’s
modest efforts to provide pro bono legal assistance); David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The
Assault on Progressive Public Interest Lawyers, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 209 (2003) (restrictions on civil legal
aid).
12. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
13. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4(b) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not form a
partnership with a nonlawyer . . . .”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5(a) (2013) (“A lawyer
shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession . . . or assist
another in doing so.”).
14. Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation,
48 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 41–105 (1998).
15. Jonathan Rose, Of Ambidexters and Daffidowndillies: Defamation of Lawyers, Legal Ethics,
and Professional Reputation, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 423, 447–48 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Bushman v. State Bar of Cal., 522 P.2d 312, 315 (Cal. 1974) (lawyer suspended for a
year where “the fee charged . . . was so exorbitant . . . as to shock the conscience”); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 682 (5th ed. 2010) (“Bar leaders and
professional codes speak out against the use of delay as a deliberate harassing tactic, but eminent
lawyers often boast shamelessly at professional meetings of their skills in delaying cases.”).
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Shakespeare’s famous line, “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the
lawyers,”17 personifies the historical vilification of lawyers. This attitude
has persisted. At the turn into the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham
launched a wholesale attack on the common law, which he called the
“Demon of Chicane,” and by extension an attack on the entire practice
of law.18 Near the turn into the twentieth century, Carl Sandburg, in The
Lawyers Know Too Much, asked: “Why does a hearse horse snicker/
[h]auling a lawyer away?”19 More recently, Dean Robert Post said that
“the lawyer is the . . . embodiment of the tension . . . between . . . common
community and the urge toward individual independence and selfassertion.”20
Before proceeding to modern systematic critiques, it is useful first to
recount the basic legal obligations that govern a lawyer’s relationship
with a client. These are the duty of confidentiality, the related rules of
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity, and the duty of
loyalty.
A. Confidentiality
The duty of confidentiality is prescribed in the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”), Rule 1.6.
That rule or a similar version is in effect in every American jurisdiction,
and substantially similar rules are in effect in other constitutional
regimes.21 Rule 1.6 (a) provides: “A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”22 This
obligation applies to information received not only from the client, but
also from other sources.23 The phrase “impliedly authorized” expresses
the general legal concept that an agent, such as a lawyer, has authority to
use client information to further the purpose of the engagement.24 A
number of exceptions are set forth in Rule 1.6(b), for example allowing
disclosure to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud in
which the lawyer’s services had been used.25

17. William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II 154 (Louis B. Wright & Virginia A. LaMar eds.,
Washington Square Press 1966) (1591).
18. 19 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 35 (John Bowring ed. 1842).
19. Carl Sandburg, Complete Poems 189 (rev. ed. 1970).
20. Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 Calif.
L. Rev. 379, 389 (1987).
21. See Hazard & Dondi, supra note 6, at ch. 6.
22. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b) (2013).
23. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 59–67 (2000).
24. See Restatement (Third) of the Law of Agency § 2.02 (2006).
25. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b) (2013).
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It may be noted that there is a similar duty of confidentiality in all
“agency” relationships, such as that of employee, and in many
professional relationships, such as the practice of medicine and nursing,
accounting, and financial advising.
For lawyers there are parallel provisions in the law of evidence—the
attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product immunity. These
rules apply in litigation and investigations. The attorney-client privilege
provides that a client (and her lawyer) generally may not be required to
disclose communications to and from the lawyer. It operates like the
privilege against self-incrimination in that it precludes the court, as well
as an opposing party, from pursuing disclosure. Further, the privilege is
available to business organizations such as corporations.26
The attorney work-product immunity provides that a lawyer may
invoke secrecy concerning documents and other information prepared or
compiled in work done for the client.27 Like the attorney-client privilege,
it is recognized in all American jurisdictions.
B. Loyalty
The lawyer’s professional duty of loyalty is formally stated in
negative terms. RPC 1.7(a) provides:
[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists
if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities
to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.28

The duty of loyalty is expressed affirmatively in Rule 1.3: “A lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”29
The duty of loyalty is extended to former clients through Rule 1.9, which
prohibits representation that is “materially adverse” to a former client in
“the same or a substantially related matter.”30 For example, if client A
was provided an assessment of one of its patents, the lawyer could not
later bring a suit against client A concerning that patent. Exceptions to
the duty of loyalty are provided for, but acting on them generally
requires consent by the affected clients.31

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(a) (2013).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 (2013).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9(a) (2013).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9(b) (2013).
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The rules of confidentiality and loyalty also generally apply not only
to the lawyer personally involved, but also to other lawyers in the same
firm. This requirement is imposed by Rule 1.10, which “imputes” to all
lawyers in a firm a limitation imposed on any of its lawyers.32 Thus, when
lawyer A receives confidences of a client, lawyer B in the same firm has
an obligation to maintain that confidence. In United States v. O’Hagan,33
for example, a lawyer was found to have illegally used information about
a corporate client of the firm—not one he was personally involved
with—to buy the company’s stock offering.
C. Charles Curtis’ THE ETHICS OF ADVOCACY
An influential beginning of systematic critiques was a 1951 article in
the Stanford Law Review, The Ethics of Advocacy, by Charles Curtis, a
well-established Boston lawyer.34 Curtis expanded his discussion in It’s
Your Law, where he wrote that a lawyer is required to “treat outsiders as
if they were barbarians and enemies,”35 that one of a lawyer’s functions is
“to lie for his client,”36 and that a lawyer is required to “say things which
he does not believe in.”37 These characterizations, although accurate as
to some lawyers’ behavior, are hyperbole. There are rules and sanctions
against such conduct.38 More important, as a practical matter, oppression
of a witness can antagonize a jury or judge and induce retaliation by
opposing counsel.
Two of Curtis’ pronouncements remain key in criticisms of law
practice: that a lawyer may lie for his client and that he may make
arguments he does not believe in. Among more recent critiques are ones
by Daniel Markovits, William Simon, David Luban, and Arthur
Applebaum. Norman Spaulding takes a more unusual approach.
D. David Markovits
The critique by Professor Daniel Markovits is the most recent and
most trenchant. It also seems most clearly wrong.
Professor Markovits leads off by stating that law practice necessarily
requires that lawyers “lie” and “cheat.”39 He argues that this conduct is

32. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.10(a) (2013).
33. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
34. Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951).
35. Charles P. Curtis, It’s Your Law 8 (1954).
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. at 17.
38. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rs. 3.4, 4.4 (2013). See, e.g., Hawk v. Superior Court,
116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); In re Reisch, 474 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
39. Markovits, supra note 7, at 3–4.
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nevertheless virtuous because lawyers thereby lead clients to appreciate
the legitimacy of the legal process, the rule of law, and democracy itself.40
On its face, this idea is bizarre. One would think a lawyer’s lying and
cheating could only be appreciated by clients who themselves are liars
and cheaters. No doubt there are such clients, and there are lawyers who
approximate Markovits’ vision. But can it be imagined that a typical
client, upon winning a verdict, leaves court enthusiastically proclaiming,
“We really cheated them, didn’t we!”? As Professor Simon has observed,
most ordinary citizens do not associate “arguing false inferences or any
other form of ‘lying’ or ‘cheating’ with fair procedure or with any kind of
legitimacy.”41
Simon questions the source of Markovits’ thesis, which is that
lawyers somehow impersonate and “imaginatively identify with” the
client.42 Markovits adapted this thesis from writings of John Keats, a poet
in the early nineteenth century. However, the adaptation is worse than
questionable.
The term taken from Keats is “negative capability,” which Keats
used in a letter to his brothers. Discussing theatre, specifically
Shakespeare’s Richard III, Keats said: “[I]t struck me what quality went
to form a man of achievement, especially in literature, and which
Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean negative capability, that
is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts,
without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.”43
In employing Keats’ term “negative capability,” Markovits omits the
words “capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts.” That phrase
would indeed describe what Keats was talking about—Richard III’s state
of mind in Shakespeare’s play.44 Instead, Markovits conjoins “negative
capability” with a passage from a different Keats letter written a year
later to someone else. In that letter Keats talks about how a poet—an
author—can project his identity onto inanimate things such as the sun
and moon.45 From this, Markovits constructs “negative capability” for a
lawyer, who he says “is similarly required, by . . . professional
detachment, to efface herself . . . [a]nd through this self-effacement . . . to
work continually as a mouthpiece for her client.”46 In simpler language,

40. Id. at 5.
41. William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic
Perspectives, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 987, 995 (2010).
42. Id. at 996 n.21.
43. Letter from John Keats to George and Thomas Keats (Dec. 22, 1817), in Life, Letters, and
Literary Remains, of John Keats 70, 71 (Richard Monkton Milnes ed., 1848) (emphasis in original).
44. See William Shakespeare, Richard III act 1, sc. 2.
45. Letter from John Keats to Richard Woodhouse (Oct. 27, 1818), in Life, Letters, and
Literary Remains, of John Keats, supra note 43, at 149, 150.
46. Markovits, supra note 7, at 93.
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the proposition is that a lawyer, in acting on behalf of a client, must make
herself disappear—“efface herself.”
This portrayal of a lawyer is simply wrong. Our legal system
requires a lawyer not to “efface” herself but to positively assert a distinct
professional identity, for example, “Your honor, my name is Sarah Smith
and I represent . . . .” A lawyer can properly speak on behalf of a client
only because she has a professional identity and the “right of audience”
separate from that of her client. A lawyer cannot properly “personify” a
client as a witness, for a lawyer is prohibited from asserting “personal
knowledge of facts in issue.”47 And there is a nest of rules imposing
responsibilities on lawyers concerning their forensic conduct.48 A lawyer
also must maintain the professional independence and detachment
required in competent practice.
“Effacement” also says nothing about the role of lawyer in giving
advice. Advice from a lawyer to a client is intelligible only if client and
lawyer are distinct—or is the client advising himself?
E. William Simon
Professor William Simon in The Practice of Justice develops a quite
different critique of the legal profession.
The profession’s official understanding is that a lawyer should
loyally further the client’s lawful interests, regardless of whether those
interests conform to the lawyer’s conception of justice.49 Simon
concludes that the lawyer’s loyalty should be to a higher ideal of
“justice,” according to which the lawyer should autonomously determine
the client’s proper interests and then pursue “actions that, considering
the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote
justice.”50
Professor Simon illustrates his thesis with a hypothetical in which a
young lawyer is representing a university in a dispute with a labor
union.51 There is a lawful but “technical” objection to the union’s
eligibility to represent university workers. In this setting, Simon says the
lawyer should conclude that justice requires disregarding the legal
technicality, thereby allowing the union to proceed with its organizing
campaign.

47. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.4(e) (2013).
48. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1–3.4 (2013).
49. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(4) (2013) (“A lawyer may withdraw . . . [if] the
client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant . . . .”); Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers § 32(3)(f) (2000). There appear to be no reported decisions in which a
lawyer has taken such a step. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of
Lawyering § 20.9 (3d ed. 2013).
50. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics 138 (1988).
51. Id. at 151–56.
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As Professors Woolley and Wendel observe in a criticism of this
thesis: “Simon’s ideal lawyer must inquire into the deep structure of the
community’s law to determine what apparent legal entitlements are just
(or meritorious, as he sometimes puts it) and which are formally valid
but not to be respected by a ‘contextual’ lawyer.”52
Professor Simon assumes that a concept of “justice” is clearly
discernible and widely shared. Furthermore, as Woolley and Wendel
observe, Professor Simon’s lawyer is “emotionally stable, introverted,
fearless, calm, cognitively reflective and rarely automatic, free of
cognitive biases, and highly intelligent,”53 quite like Professor Simon.
And, one might add, the junior lawyer is free of such burdens as student
loan debt and dependents and also has other employment opportunities
at the ready.
Professor Simon’s hypothetical lawyer is a junior associate, perhaps
because it is difficult to imagine that an experienced lawyer would think
it ethical to follow the Simon recipe. Indeed, it is improbable that even
junior lawyers would think it proper to do so. As Professor Wasserstrom
observed, “[O]nce [a] lawyer has agreed to represent the client . . . it
[would be] morally wrong to defeat the client’s expectations about . . .
the lawyer’s actions on the client’s behalf.”54 Moreover, a lawyer’s
reluctance to disregard a favorable technicality is not because she cannot
imagine a better state of justice. Nor is it because she cannot distinguish
between a legal technicality and substantive justice. It is because an
experienced lawyer recognizes, as Wasserstrom says, that asserting her
autonomous sense of “justice” to override the client’s lawful position
would be a rank betrayal of the client. It would also be a breach of a legal
duty to the client.55
An experienced lawyer is just as likely as a junior one to think that
union activity was not necessarily beneficial for the client’s employees;
there have been corrupt or exploitive unions. An experienced lawyer
would know that legal technicalities are often expeditious means of
achieving lawful objectives.
Beyond these considerations, in a regime where such autonomy
were permissible, it can only be imagined how prospective employers of
legal staff—law firms and corporate law departments—would function.
Knowing that clients would be fearful of assigning their matters to
impetuous swords of the lord, prospective employers would interrogate
employment candidates about their concepts of loyalty and justice. Law
52. Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 1065, 1084 (2010) (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 1085.
54. Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in The Good Lawyer, supra note 1, at 25, 31.
55. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2013) (“Loyalty and independent judgment
are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.”).
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firms thereby would be constituted of lawyers rigidly conforming to
conventional professional responsibility and to ideals of justice that
Professor Simon would rightly regard as reactionary.
Nevertheless, Professor Simon demonstrates that lawyers are often
called upon to pursue objectives for a client that they would not seek for
themselves. The discrepancy between a lawyer’s sense of right and the
duty to client is the pivot on which ordinary law practice can be said to
be immoral. Indeed, it is the lawyer’s personal sense of right that would
result in that assessment.
Professor Simon is surely right in concluding that lawyers should
think not only about legal technicalities, but also about justice in broader
moral-political terms. RPC 2.1 permits and encourages such a
perspective: “In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but
to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors . . . .”56 Thus, in his hypothetical, the junior’s reflection about
justice could lead her to suggest that the client-university not resort to
legal technicality. Among a typical university’s constituents are people
who would think that relying on such a technicality was antisocial and
dishonorable.
F. David Luban
Professor David Luban has provided the most extensive discussion
on the relation between lawyers’ ethics and what is taken to be common
morality. His basic thesis is that there is a “genuine tension between
common morality and role moralities,” particularly the role morality of
law practice.57
Like most critics, Luban accepts that, whatever might be common
morality, the role of defense counsel in criminal cases is morally
defensible, even if it involves a lawyer trying to persuade a judge or jury
of something the lawyer himself does not believe. The strongest defense
of that position has been that by Professor Monroe Freedman in
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer.58 The
justification is that criminal prosecution involves the power of the state
pitched against a relatively helpless accused, whose dignity requires
stalwart defensive advocacy.
In other writings, Professor Luban has been somewhat ambivalent
about the moral legitimacy of criminal defense, saying that “[When] a
lawyer defending a guilty [client] . . . succeeds in winning an acquittal, an

56. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2.1 (2013).
57. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 125 (1988).
58. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 64 Mich.
L. Rev. 1469 (1966); see Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics (4th
ed. 2010).
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injustice is done.”59 This criticism, however, involves a serious confusion
of categories. The acquittal of an accused in the legal system is “justice”
according to law. If an acquittal is a moral “injustice,” it is because the
lawyer “knows” that his client was guilty. But the lawyer “knows” of his
client’s guilt through the lawyer’s personal assessment of the client, a
source of information that is excluded in administering justice according
to law.
In any event, the justification for defending an accused does not
extend to civil litigation, or to representation in negotiation and
transaction work, which are the typical activities of most lawyers.
Concerning these forms of law practice, Professor Luban has said that
“Anything . . . that is morally wrong for a nonlawyer to do on behalf of
another person is morally wrong for a lawyer to do as well.”60 In accord
with Professor Simon, Luban proposes that the rules “be redrafted to
allow lawyers to forego immoral tactics or the pursuit of unjust ends.”61
However, the RPC has already gone a distance in that direction. Rule
1.16(b)(4) permits a lawyer to withdraw if “the client insists upon taking
action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement.”62
On the other hand, Alan Donagan recognizes the heterogeneity of
the community’s mores: “Individuals and institutions in [modern
industrial] society will not only have various ends their pursuit of which
will sometimes bring them into conflict, but will also uphold different
views of what is morally permissible and socially desirable.”63 And yet
Professor Luban does not acknowledge that in such a milieu, there is no
“common morality” with which to contrast lawyer morality. Nor could
the community’s jumble of moral ideas yield a definite idea of “justice,”
which is the basis of Professor Simon’s critique.
G. Norman Spaulding
Professor Norman Spaulding’s thoughtful analyses of law practice
and professional ethics goes in a different direction.64 He criticizes a
widely shared justification for the attorney-client privilege embraced by
the Supreme Court—that it facilitates client “compliance” with law.65
59. Luban, supra note 57, at 145. Luban’s “guilty client” is a client that the attorney “knows” is
guilty of the charged crime.
60. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 154 (1988).
61. Luban, supra note 57, at 159.
62. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1.16(b)(4) (2013).
63. Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in The Good Lawyer,
supra note 1, at 123, 128.
64. See Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1
(2003); Norman W. Spaulding, The Privilege of Probity, 26 Geo. J. Legal Ed. 301 (2013).
65. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Norman W. Spaulding, Compliance, Creative
Deviance, and Resistance to Law: A Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2013 J. Prof’l Law. 135.
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Professor Spaulding says that this rationale is wrong as a matter of
history and policy. He argues that a client is entitled, not only to know
how to comply with the law, but to a realistic appraisal of whether the
law will actually be enforced. He is surely correct that clients often want
to include “legal risk” in considering a proposed course of action. By
implication, Spaulding affirms that it is not immoral to give advice that
could lead a client to pursue a legally wrongful course of conduct.
Spaulding further suggests that the rules as written do not allow the
lawyer to engage in such realism. However, Rule 1.2(d) provides: “A
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss
the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a
client . . . .”66 A lawyer can properly interpret this rule as allowing a
client to be given a realistic appraisal of legal risk. Given what many
consider to be our excessive legal regulations, and their very uneven
enforcement, providing realistic advice about legal deviance is surely
defensible.
H. Arthur Applebaum
Professor Arthur Applebaum makes the usual criticisms that “good
lawyers . . . intentionally attempt to convince judges, jurors, litigants, and
contracting parties of the truth of propositions that the lawyer believes to
be false,” and that “part of what adversaries in professional life do for a
living is violate persons by deceiving and coercing them.”67 Of special
interest, however, is Applebaum’s recognition of similarities between the
ethical problems of practicing lawyers and those confronting other
professionals, specifically business managers, politicians, and military
officers. There are two basic points in the comparisons.
First, in our open and conflict-ridden society, there are many roles
and relationships that entail partisanship, deception, and use of coercion.
They involve protagonists on behalf of constituents or “clients”—people
and institutions favored by the actor. Second, the roles of these
protagonists are lawful and serve “our needs for social order,” in
Bernard Williams’ phrase.
Thus, business managers are committed to the interests of their
company’s shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and people
near its facilities. Business operations employ the coercion involved in
business competition. Business managers can use lawful force to
discharge unsatisfactory subordinates and terminate unsatisfactory
external engagements. Sometimes they must dissimulate, for example,

66. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2013).
67. Arthur I. Applebaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and
Professional Life 104, 175 (1999).
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about a company’s trade secrets and its profit prospects. Business
managers are regulated directly through the concept of fiduciary duties
and indirectly through the network of regulations imposed on the
enterprises they manage, for example, accuracy in company financial
statements, fairness to employees, environmental compliance, and so on.68
Among politicians, those holding elective office are partisans who
succeeded in competitive elections. Politicians use propaganda; they
affirm propositions they may not personally believe in; they often
minimize what their programs will cost. They are regulated by standards
such as residence requirements and by legal definitions of their positions,
for example, a district attorney cannot vote in the city council.
Legislatures, city councils, and other deliberative bodies are governed by
procedural rules.69
The managers of modern administrative agencies are more or less
politicians.70 Agencies are governed by networks of rules that govern
their jurisdiction, procedure, and regulatory powers. Their internal
processes are often obscure, so that knowing how an agency actually
works is a valuable asset.
The military’s very purpose is use of force and military technique
inherently includes large-scale deception. As agents for a sovereign
principal, military officers carry out missions in which they may not have
confidence. Their projects often inflict injury on innocent third parties,
“collateral damage” as it is now called. Nevertheless, military operations
are governed by law, notably “Lincoln’s Code,” adopted in the Civil War
and emulated by many other countries.71 The military is also indirectly
regulated by international norms such as the Geneva Convention.
In candid moments we recognize that partisanship, dissimulation,
and coercion are elements of human existence. The “common morality”
professed in the Judeo-Christian tradition demands that we “Do unto
others as you would have them do unto you.” But we hold friends in
greater favor than strangers and usually hold fellow countrymen in
greater favor than aliens.72 Indeed, forms of injustice are pervasive in our
own society. As Amartya Sen has said, they reflect “hardy social
divisions, linked with divisions of class, gender, rank, location, religion,
68. These days, many businesses also have internal codes of conduct. See Janet S. Adams, et al.,
Codes of Ethics as Signals for Ethical Behavior, 29 J. Bus. Ethics 199 (2001).
69. The standard text is Robert’s Rules of Order. These were derived from the rules of the U.S.
House of Representatives, and the modern version runs more than 250 pages. See Robert’s Rules of
Order: Simplified and Applied (2d ed. 2001).
70. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 302 (1989).
71. See generally John F. Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History
(2012).
72. Aristotle noted that “[A] man does not seem to have the same duties to a friend, a stranger, a
comrade, and a schoolfellow.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. VIII, at 159 (Lesley Brown ed.,
David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
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community and other established barriers.”73 Professor Michael Walzer
has tried to reconcile the facts of discriminatory social practice with the
ideal of equal justice, but in unconvincing terms.74 The “distinct
understandings” in a society can call for grossly unequal treatment of
some community members, such as the Untouchables in India.75
These are among the “imperfections” that generate “social needs,”
as Professor Williams said. Sir Isaiah Berlin offers an alternative moral
framework that deserves recognition.

VII. Berlin’s MACHIAVELLI
A framework distinct from “common morality” is presented by Sir
Isaiah Berlin in The Originality of Machiavelli.76 Passages from
Machiavelli’s The Prince illustrate what Berlin is talking about.
Machiavelli says that a ruler must be “a great feigner and dissembler”77
and exercise “cunning assisted by fortune.”78 He must appear to be
religiously upright, but “a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by
doing so it would be against his interest.”79
Berlin interprets Machiavelli as setting up two competing moralities.
According to Machiavelli, different people pursue different ends. “Men
need rulers because they require someone to order human groups
governed by diverse interests and bring them security, stability, [and]
protection against enemies.”80 These diverse interests lead to two
moralities. “One is the morality of the pagan world: its values are
courage, vigour, fortitude in adversity, . . . order, discipline, . . . justice, . . .
and [the] power needed to secure their satisfaction . . . . Against this
moral universe . . . stands . . . [the other morality], Christian morality”—
we should say Judeo-Christian morality, with its virtues of “charity,
mercy, sacrifice, . . . [and] forgiveness of enemies.”81 “Society is,
normally, a battlefield in which there are conflicts between and within
groups. These conflicts can be controlled only by the judicious use of
both persuasion and force.”82

73. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 389 (2009).
74. He defines justice as beliefs “rooted in the distinct understandings of . . . a shared way of life,”
and states that “[t]o override those understandings is . . . to act unjustly.” Michael Walzer, Spheres
of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 314 (1983).
75. Walzer evidently did not notice the social coercion that kept the Untouchables in their place.
76. See Isaiah Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, in Against the Current: Essays in the
History of Ideas 25, 25 (Henry Hardy ed., 2001).
77. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince 70 (Luigi Ricci trans., R&R Ltd. 1901) (1532).
78. Id. at 37. “Fortune” refers to fortuna, the unpredictability in events.
79. Id. at 70.
80. See Berlin, supra note 76, at 40.
81. Id. at 45.
82. Id. at 41.
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According to Berlin, “what are commonly thought of as the central
Christian virtues . . . are insuperable obstacles to the building of . . . [a]
society that . . . satisfies men’s permanent desires and interests.”83
Indeed, “men who pursue [Christian] ideals are bound to be defeated
and to lead other people to ruin.”84 He concludes that individuals “are
perfectly entitled to lead a morally good life[] [and] be a private
citizen . . . [b]ut . . . must not make [themselves] responsible for the lives
of others.”85 “There are two worlds, that of personal morality and that of
public organisation.”86
Berlin then returns to a proposition that is woven into many of his
other writings. He states that “[o]ne of the deepest assumptions of
western political thought is . . . that there exists some single principle which
not only regulates the course of the sun and the stars, but . . . . functions
. . . in a single harmonious whole . . . .”87 However, according to Berlin,
“there might exist ends . . . which were equally ultimate, but incompatible
with one another, that there might exist no single universal overarching
standard . . . .”88
Berlin concludes, “[T]he path is open to empiricism, pluralism,
[and] . . . compromise.”89
A. “Personal Morality” and “Public Organization”
Berlin’s two moral categories, “personal morality” and “public
organization,” are useful in thinking about the morality of law practice.
The domain of “personal morality” is secularized Judeo-Christianity and
roughly corresponds to what David Luban has called “common
morality” and, as we have seen, what William Simon refers to as
“justice.” This morality is manifested in friendship, empathy, honesty,
community, accommodation, and a measure of charity. In our society,
most people who become lawyers have been brought up in a JudeoChristian milieu and its corresponding morality. Their pre-law
acculturation survives entry into the practice of law, so that most lawyers
accept Judeo-Christianity as their “personal morality” and practice it in
relationships with family and friends.
Some forms of law practice can partake of “personal morality.”
Such can be said of the professional practice of the classic “elbow
lawyer,” that is, a trusted legal counsel sitting at the client’s elbow.
Indeed, Professor Charles Fried has argued that all client relationships
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 78.
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are a kind of friendship.90 But most client-lawyer relationships are
commercial friendships governed by terms of an engagement contract
and receding when that contract expires.
The other world, “public organization,” involves affairs of the polis,
to use the classic Greek term for a social-political community. The polis,
as Berlin observes, is a “battlefield in which there are conflicts between
and within groups.”91 To the same effect is Donagan’s observation that
members of our society “not only have various ends . . . but . . . different
views of what is morally permissible and socially desirable.”92
The thesis derived from Machiavelli is that these “different views”
and “conflicts between and within groups” can be kept under control
only with the aid of “rulers.” Machiavelli had in mind the Florentine
rulers; their modern counterparts are officials and groups in government
with authority to fashion and administer policies for the whole
community. To carry out its functions, government employs what Berlin
calls “judicious use of both persuasion and force.”93 Law is the
instrument of the technique and the lawyer’s vocation deploys that
instrument.
Many lawyers have not squarely confronted these characteristics of
their professional calling, including the tension between their personal
morality and the mores of their vocation. When lawyers speak of
“justice” they usually refer to their discourses on behalf of clients and the
deliberations of judges—peaceful exercises in rationality—information
that is protected by the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality and hence
excluded. But force is in the background and the legal order combines
reason and fiat.
The key transaction in the lawyer’s calling is admission to the bar.
This is often viewed as a mere formality and indeed a nuisance.
However, legally, it is a critical transformation of identity. Peaceful
adherence to judicial decisions usually prevails, supported by recognition
that force may be brought to bear if it does not. The law graduate can
adhere to traditional Judeo-Christian morality in personal relationships
and some professional ones. In becoming a member of the bar, however,
the law graduate becomes ex officio an “officer of the legal system.”94
Becoming ex officio an officer of the legal system should include

90. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976).
91. Berlin, supra note 76, at 41.
92. Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in The Good Lawyer,
supra note 1, at 123, 128.
93. Berlin, supra note 76, at 41.
94. The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules states: “A lawyer, as a member of the legal
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality of justice.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. P1 (2013).
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recognition that the governing professional mores are distinct from their
personal mores, quite as the governing mores of a military officer are
distinct from their personal mores. The professional outlook should be
sober about the contrariness of human behavior and the possibilities of
true justice. Faithful commitment to an imperfect system can make it a
“higher calling.”
B. Participating in Government
Many lawyers would be startled, indeed offended, at being
identified as instruments of the government. This identity would be
particularly uncomfortable for lawyers engaged in representing
victimized people and radical causes. It probably would be equally
galling to lawyers engaged in representing conservative causes. But
lawyers across the professional spectrum are engaged in invoking the law
and thus bringing to bear the coercive power of government. On the left,
they do so, for example, by seeking injunctions against environmental
violations or employment discrimination, pursuing habeas corpus for
prisoners, lobbying for reform legislation, and so on. On the right there is
defense of corporations, finding openings in the tax laws, and so on.
The practice of law can be viewed as a highly decentralized form of
the separation of powers. Familiar forms of the separation of powers are,
of course, the division of authority between the legislative and the
executive, and the division between them and the judiciary. The power
exercised in law practice, even by lawyers employed in the government,
is derivative from the authority of the judiciary. Lawyers have legal
capacity, by virtue of their professional status, to invoke the judicial
authority to challenge other elements of the government (suing the
police for example), or to interdict some other actor in the private sector
(such as suing a landlord).95
The client-lawyer relationship is thus political as well as legal. As
said by Robert Kutak, head of the committee that drafted the ABA
Model Rules: “The basic premise of virtually all our institutions is that
open and relatively unrestrained competition among individuals produces
the maximum collective good. . . . [T]he adversary system of justice reflects
the same deep-seated values we place on competition among economic
suppliers, political parties, and moral and political ideas.”96

95. The coercive effect of litigation can operate in cases that do not go to trial. In the pretrial
stage, parties have to submit to interrogation in depositions and hand over relevant documents; the
resulting disclosures can be embarrassing. Parties often settle to avoid such exposure.
96. Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in The Good Lawyer, supra
note 1, at 172, 173–74.
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Conclusion
In political terms the lawyer-client relationship can be understood as
a small caucus organized to put pressure on some other element in the
polis. Visualized in this way, the client-lawyer combination fits into the
classic political theory of John Locke. In The Second Treatise of
Government, Locke says:
[E]very man [who has] entered into civil society, has [thereby] quitted
his power to punish . . . which he has given up to the legislative in all
cases where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the
commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments
of the commonwealth . . . they being made by himself or his
representative. . . . [T]he legislative and executive power . . . judge . . .
how far injuries from without are to be vindicated . . . .97

97. John Locke, Of Civil Government Second Treatise 69–70 (Henry Regnery Co. 1966) (1689).

